Introduction
'Like memory, tradition is refracted through the contemporary social realities of the communities in which it is enacted, such that it comes in important respects to reflect, even to signify those realities' (Kirk 2010:62) . ' Bultmann's model is burdened with significant problems stemming from a lack of understanding of orality, gospel narrativity, and, last but not least, memory' (Kelber 2002:63−64) .
'Neither of these views ['Presentist' ('Constructionist') or 'Traditionalist'] ... is particularly insightful to understand the complexities of remembering, which is always a fluid negotiation between the desires of the present and the legacies of the past' (Olick 2006:13a) .
as well. Cattel and Climo are illustrative: 'Individual and collective memory come together in the stories of individual lives. The process of constructing a life story is heavily mediated by social construction … ' (2002:22) . I therefore begin with a little history and observation about individual memory.
Interest in memory and its functions has deep roots in the intellectual history of humankind. In the West, the ancient Greek poet Hesiod sang of the long-haired, golden-garbed Titaness Mnēmosunē, the goddess of memory (with the Greek mnēmē meaning 'memory' or 'remembrance'), who created the power of memory and storytelling, discovered the uses of reason, named every object and, thus, birthed language and made social discourse possible (Theogony). Her daughters, the nine Muses, were said to inspire poets, philosophers and musicians, whose oral activity was often performed with dance and music; they became the guardians of collective memory. The term 'memory' in Greek is etymologically related to 'truth' (with the Greek lēthē meaning 'forgetfulness' and the Greek alētheia meaning 'not forgetting' or 'truth'). Recall Plato's theory that education is merely remembering what one already knows, but has forgotten (Meno), and Socrates' comments about the close relationship between memory and knowledge (Theaetetus). Aristotle expanded on Plato's notion of memory as an 'image' (eikōn) that is stamped on the mind like a wax seal (Aristotle On Memory and Reminiscence; Coleman 2005; Craig 2010 ). These themes influenced philosopher Paul Ricoeur's reflections about memory and history (2004:7−21 ).
The ancient Greek and Roman rhetoricians observed the human propensity to remember in relation to place or space and so developed the memory aid of associating the themes of oral discourse with various rooms, corners and statues of an imaginary 'memory palace' (Cicero De Oratore II.lxxxvi, (350) (351) (352) (353) .This 'mnemotechnique' persevered until the time of the Renaissance (Carruthers 1990; Rossi 2000; Yates 1966 ). In the 17th century, philosophers shifted from visual to linguistic -semantic and logical -memory aids. 'Knowledge henceforth resided in texts ...' and memory was considered to be a process of simply storing and retrieving information (Fentress & Wickham 1992:14) .
Fascination with individual memory and memorising continued into the modern era. Semi-autobiographical novelist Marcel Proust in Remembrance of Things Past made the now famous observation that, when he smelled the aroma of Madeleine cookies, he always recalled his childhood experience of eating Madeleines and drinking tea on Sundays at his aunt's house (1913−1927:48−51) . The early behaviourist Hermann Ebbinghaus reports in Über das Gedächtnis about his experiments in the laboratory with the human ability to remember nonsense syllables (1885). In Matter and Memory, philosopher Henri Bergson challenged the empiricists, positivists, historicists, scientists and mechanistic materialists of his day by claiming that the locus of memory is not simply 'brain matter', but the creative human spirit, the élan vital (life force). He distinguished 'recollective memory', or episodes from one's autobiography, from 'habit memory' ('procedural memory'), such as that of riding a bicycle (1896). Frederick C. Bartlett in Remembering also challenged behaviourism's mechanistic tendencies with his view that memories are not simply recollections of the past, but are, rather, mental reconstructions which are informed by experience, personal habits and cultural attitudes, in short, what he called an 'effort at meaning' in and for the present (1932).
Bartlett's notion of mental reconstructions of the past as an 'effort at meaning' in and for the present is a form of constructionism, which is the view that what is normally considered to be 'objective reality' is really a construction, that, in this case, takes place in the human mind. His view opens up a debated topic in individual memory studies, namely, the fallibility of individual human memory as it attempts to 'retrieve' the past for the present. Cognitive psychologist Alan Baddeley holds the widespread opinion that:
[memory] retrieval … is probably one of the most vulnerable points in human memory, with biased situations leading to failure to recall, or possibly to partial recall, which in turn is subject to distortion when we try to interpret our incomplete memory. (Baddeley 1989:57) Neurologists usually agree with the above opinion. Steven Rose (2005 Rose ( :161−162, see 1993 , for example, describes memory retrieval as a 'biological cascade' in the brain: we do not remember the initial events themselves -anythingbut only our previous memories of them; our memories are continually transformed over time.
Not surprisingly, the fallibility of memory in relation to traumatic events has produced a wide-ranging, crossdisciplinary, intellectual debate, called 'the memory wars' (Campbell 2003; Crews 1995; Loftus 1980 Loftus , 1993 Loftus , 2004 Schacter 1999 Schacter , 2001 … the call for a 'middle ground', like the 'memory wars', can distract our attention from the range of alternative positions that feminists have explored and from the need for positions that challenge the current framing of these debates. (Campbell 2003:15) However, prominent psychologist and memory researcher Daniel Schacter writes, '... there is a middle ground in the recovered-memories debate; the problem is to identify it ' (1996:277, see 2001) . Neurological reporter Rita Carter summarises the debate: 'The best evidence yet suggests that both recovered and false memories are real phenomena … False memories are not unusual. In fact, they are the norm ... ' (1998:167a) .
The overall conclusion of individual memory specialists appears to be that individual memories are constructed and subject to distortion. Memories transform previous memories over time, forming a 'cascade of memories'. This conclusion does not totally destroy memory's recall of something or someone, but it clearly indicates that constructionism is a major factor in individual memory and, as such, must be taken very seriously.
With this in mind, I return to the legacy of Mnēmosunē's daughters, the Nine Muses, that is, to collective memory.
Collective memory, social memory, cultural memory
The 'father of collective memory' is generally acknowledged to be Maurice Halbwachs (1877 Halbwachs ( −1945 cf. Coser 1992; Hutton 1993:73−89; Olick 2006:6−8; Wachtel 1986 It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories ' (1925:38) . Some of Halbwach's key ideas are:
• Memory is usually related to images and places (the rhetoricians' 'memory palace' mentioned earlier).
• Memory of events and persons is selective, analogous to pools of water and rocks that remain on the coast when the tide recedes.
• Memory does not recall the real past, but only constructions of it; it 'distorts' the past in its need to show that an 'event' has a significance beyond the event itself.
• Memory and history are opposed entities: history begins where memory no longer functions.
• Memory constructs the past for the present, especially in relation to one's social group.
• The social group neither totally dispenses with, nor altogether determines, individual memory -'it is individuals as group members who remember ' (1992 [1950]:48, cf. 1925 [1990] :43, 51) -although it does limit its range of options.
• Social groups identify themselves and are identified by, their 'collective memories'. • Different groups may have different or even competing, versions of the same persons or events (which amounts to memory 'contestation').
• The past tends to be 'constructed' as a narrative with a beginning, middle and a satisfactory ending.
• Dreams are an exception; they are fragmented, irrational and distorted, but they lack a social framework (1992 [1950] :39−42).
• Commemoration is also an exception; it is a conscious attempt to reinforce recollection, thus continuing and fixing the natural memory's focus on place and time.
Halbwachs influenced a number of academic fields. Collective memory has also influenced studies of ritual. In How Societies Remember (1989) , social anthropologist Paul Connerton examines how ritual performances -for example, the Nazi festivals which were held during the time of the Third Reich -are commemorations that reinforce collective or national identity. For Connerton, such ceremonies are performative and are expressed in bodily gestures.
Similarly, political anthropologist John Gillis comments on memory construction and commemoration in relation to social and national identity:
We need to be reminded that memories and identities are not fixed things, but representations or constructions of reality, subjective rather than objective phenomena … We are constantly revising our memories to suit our current identities. Memories help us make sense of the world we live in; and 'memory work' is … embedded in complex class, gender and power relations that determine what is remembered (or forgotten), by whom, and for what end … National identities are, like everything, constructed and reconstructed … (Gillis 1994:3, 4) Jan Assmann is more interested in the broader view of collective memory. He states that, whereas social memory takes place in small groups and is disorganised and unspecialised, cultural memory -'a core domain comprising religion, art, history, and morality' (2006:68) -takes place in large social entities, such as a nation state or an entire culture and is organised and specialised (see Kirk 2005) . Assmann is a constructionist: cultural memory does not deal with the 'real other', but with human constructions and projections of the other. In contrast to Halbwachs' contrast between history and memory, however, Assmann demonstrates the critical importance of cultural memory for (re)constructing history. His Moses the Egyptian offers an illustration: Western culture, following the Bible, 'forgets' about Moses the 'pagan', Egyptian and polytheist and 'remembers' him as a monotheistic Jew, the archetypal opponent of polytheism. 'Moses is a figure of memory but not of history, while [Pharaoh] Akhenaten is a figure of history but not of memory' (1997:2).
Jeffrey Olick (2006) , who still prefers the expression 'collective memory', defines it broadly, allowing room for individual memory:
Collective memory is merely a broad, sensitising umbrella, and not a precise operational definition. For, upon closer examination, collective memory really refers to a wide variety of mnemonic products and practices, often quite different from one another. The former (products) include stories, rituals, books, statues, presentations, speeches, images, pictures, records, historical studies, surveys, etc.; the latter (practices) include reminiscence, recall, representation, commemoration, celebration, regret, renunciation, disavowal, denial, rationalisation, excuse, acknowledgement, and many others... To focus on collective memory as a variety of products and practices is, thus, to reframe the antagonism between individualist and collectivist approaches to memory more productively as a matter of moments in a dynamic process. This, to me, is the real message of Halbwachs' diverse insights. (Olick 2006:8b) In summary, Halbwachs' legacy is found in a number of different fields and is consistently constructionist. Jeffrey Olick also has a broad, inclusive view that relates individual and collective strains dynamically.
Social Memory, Orality and the Gospels
The incorporation of social memory studies into biblical study has been driven in part by the initiative and work of Alan Kirk and Tom Thatcher who edited and contributed to (2005) and who chair the section 'Mapping memory: tradition, texts, and identity' in the Society of Biblical Literature. It has also found a place in the Society's Social-Scientific Criticism of the New Testament (Duling 2006b) . Because social memory studies have become particularly relevant for attempting to solve the complex problem of oral tradition in the gospels, in the current article, I shall focus on the work of Werner Kelber who has dedicated himself to this problem.
Memory, tradition, and text: uses of the past in Early Christianity
Social memory theorists Fentress and Wickham state, 'What defines oral history, and sets it apart from other branches of history, is ... its reliance on memory rather than texts ' (1992:3) . Oral history, as it relates to the gospels, was defined in the 20th century by Rudolf Bultmann (1934 Bultmann ( [1926 Bultmann's view is that the gospels are characterised by multiple layers of oral tradition and that secondary accretions must be removed from these traditions to restore them to their earliest forms. Thereby the developing oral tradition -'the history of the tradition' -is revealed.
Analysis of oral traditions as formulated by Dibelius and Bultmann (Dibelius 1935 [1919] ; Bultmann 1963 Bultmann [1921 Gerhardsson is acknowledged as the most significant figure in relation to introducing memorisation into the study of gospel tradition. To be sure, his model has been criticised by some for drawing on rabbinic materials that are later than the New Testament (Smith 1963) and that stress memorisation, whereas Jesus' words occur in many versions in the gospel traditions (Davies 1962; cf. Perrin 1967:30−32) . However, Gerhardsson's painstaking approach is more detailed and carefully nuanced than is Riesenfeld's, which has led to his contributions having recently received renewed appreciation (ed. Kelber & Byrskog 2009; Neusner 1998:xv− xvii) . Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the rabbinic model is rooted in the activities of a literary elite which are not typical of the gospel writers (Kirk 2009:156−63 Kelber (1997 Kelber ( , 2002 Kelber ( , 2005a Kelber ( , 2005b Kelber ( , 2006 Kelber ( , 2007 Kelber ( , 2009 ed. Horsley, Draper & Foley 2006 The concepts of original form and variants have no validity in oral life, nor does the one of ipsissima vox, if by that one means the authentic version over against secondary ones. 'In a sense each performance is "an" original, if not "the" original'. (Lord 2000:120) (Kelber 1997 (Kelber :30, cf. 2009 In addition to the above, if it is also taken into consideration that the oral gospel came from a rural and not an urban, environment, one of Kelber's (1997) central theses appears:
Mark's Gospel … came into textual existence less by extension of an antecedent oral tradition than by resistance to oral drives, norms, and authorities … [It is] a stunning departure from oral tradition. (Kelber 1997:xix) In his early work, Kelber argued that the written gospels distance the reader from Jesus, making the creative Jesus' own spontaneous oral performance 'voiceless'. Goody 1987) . Joanna Dewey argued that, although the Gospel of Mark was written, it was written to be recited orally (1994, cf. 2004 ). I note that such an idea was not new to oral performance theorists who were interested in memory. Yugoslav Krinka Vidaković Petrov integrated constructionist memory theory with orality of the gospels, stressing that human memory in oral performance is imperfect. She stated that oral performers intentionally alter their performances to fit their audiences or to evoke favourable responses (Petrov 1989 ). Finally, she argued that the four gospels have shifts that are characteristic of memory and oral communication:
namely, that a story or song has a latent existence in the memory of a performer and is actualised only when orally performed and communicated. Every performance, however, may produce a new variant or version, since it is unlikely that the text would be reproduced exactly. (Petrov 1989:78−79) Parry and Lord suggested that no original exists in oral performance. Petrov agrees, stating the view that the performer is not bound by any 'objective original'. However, she emphasises the performer's conscious altering of a story or song to fit an audience, in such a way as to actualise its potential and to produce 'variants' or 'versions' of the original, conveying the idea that some sort of stable content is transmitted, a content that resides in the memory. The point has been increasingly discussed, to the extent that, recently, some semblance of balance between 'fixity and flexibility', 'continuity and discontinuity', or 'stability and diversity', is sought (Mournet 2009:52, 221, n. 59 ).
Other oral performance theorists have lent their support to the idea that the written gospels, especially the Gospel of Mark, were memorised and performed (Shiner 2003; cf. Rhoads 2010) . Thomas Boomershine (1987) suggests that written gospels orally recited do not distance the audience, as Kelber claims for the written Gospel of Mark. Boomershine admits Kelber's point that there was a shift from orality to scribality, comparing the shift to that from oral tradition to written Christ traditions, the latter of which are indebted to Hellenistic literary strategies. In terms of such thinking, although the gospel is 'frozen orality', it is, nonetheless, 'frozen orality ' (2003:199−202 ). Dunn, following Bailey (1991) , rejects 'uncontrolled informal' oral transmission (in terms of Bultmann and rumour transmission) and 'controlled formal' (in terms of Gerhardsson and Quran memorisation) in preference for the model of 'informal controlled' oral tradition, which requires control in the recitation of some kinds of material, but flexibility in others. The key point here is that Dunn joins the critical chorus in thinking that Kelber's early work tends to overplay the shift from oral to written culture and to devalue written culture. Dunn emphasises the continuity of memory in tradition (for a critique of Dunn which claims that the Gospel of John is not in continuity in the sense of fixity, but is deeply constructionist, see Painter 2007:240−245) .
Finally, John Dominic Crossan (1998:45−89) praises the 'therapeutic necessity and strategic benefit' -namely, the shock value -of Kelber's separation of oral from written culture, giving orality pre-eminence. Crossan points out that Kelber later admits that 'a novel approach requires a strong thesis' (Kelber 1994:159 Crossan cites several authorities on oral and written tradition (Goody 1987; Stock 1983; Street 1984) , concluding with reference to memory theorists Fentress and Wickham (1992) :
The mere fact that a society has acquired the ability to represent its knowledge in written forms does not mean that that society has ceased to be an oral culture as well. We remain an oral society, and the ways in which we pattern our social memory continue to reflect, albeit in altered forms, the same practices and thought processes of preliterate cultures. Writing may absolve us of the need to learn complex mnemotechniques; it does not absolve us of the need to speak. (Fentress & Wickham 1992:46) Crossan makes a related point about Kelber's tendency to prefer Parry's 'no original' in oral performance (which Crossan calls 'performatory multiformity') over a stable core structure in tradition (which Crossan calls a 'traditional matrix'). For Crossan (1998), there has to be some core of structural stability in the oral tradition:
there must be some way of recognizing versions of the same theme, plot, or story as distinct from different themes, plots, or stories. Call that structuralist stability, if you wish … (Crossan 1998:87) This stability resides in memory.
There is an irony in all such critiques: the scholar most responsible for bringing 'orality' into view in Marcan studies, in contrast to the usual 'scribal' approach to Mark, is deeply appreciated, but is also challenged for overstating his case. The basic critique has been that orality and scribality overlap and that the written Marcan gospel was actually performed orally. Memory of a text is involved.
Kelber responds to his critics by clarifying and qualifying, but not denying, his position ( :Introduction, 2005a . On the one hand, he maintains a version of his earlier position, saying that 'Jesus' oral proclamation mutated into the scribal medium ' (2006:19a) . He also speaks of a writer's 'scribally enforced distance from hearers, which may enhance both the desire and the ability to break with tradition, to canonize an alternate viewpoint, and thereby implement a form of forgetfulness ' (2005a:229) . He objects that the 'great divide' criticism misses his nuances. He has claimed only that the oral phase was 'predominantly oral'; he has always recognised that Mark used both written and oral sources and he has never meant that writing puts an end to orality. On the other hand, he admits that the gospels might have been dictated and performed orally. He allows that there were parallels between the oral tradent and the written manuscript copyist, both of whom constructed the text for the present (Epp 2004; Parker 1997) . He is sympathetic with scribalism's attempt to bring the past in line with the present (2006:21). Most importantly, he softens his tendency to separate oral culture from written culture. In a recent statement, he says:
In whatever form the oral−textual dynamics are specifically conceptualised, the premise of oral−textual interfacing enjoys the full support of current orality−literacy studies and large parts of rabbinic scholarship. (Kelber 2009:192) It should also be noted, with respect to the 'great divide', that Kelber's critics have missed the important point that he does not abandon the connection between the oral and written gospel in his original groundbreaking book of 1983 (Kelber in Kelber & Thatcher 2008:29−30) . In his conclusion to the work, he reaffirms the distance between the oral and written gospel, that is, Jesus' spoken parabolic Word which proclaims the Kingdom of God is not the same as the references to the Kingdom of God expressed in a written gospel about Jesus' life and death. Yet, he also claims that Jesus' spoken parable :
… furnishes linguistic and theological connection between the speaker in parables and the written gospel. Both gospel and oral parables transcend their respective narratives by pointing to the Kingdom of God. The evangelist enacts the parabolic dynamic of Jesus' language much as the Platonic dialogues represent the Socratic form of philosophical of reasoning. The gospel as written parable may thus be understood as Jesus' Word bequeathed to
Mark. (Kelber 1997 (Kelber [1983 :220)
Still, such a conclusion in no way denies the possibility of a conflictual relationship between orality and scribality (Kelber in Kelber & Thatcher 2008:30) .
Most important for the current article, Kelber's more recent restatements about oral tradition are buttressed with social memory studies (Kelber 2002 (Kelber , 2005a (Kelber , 2005b (Kelber , 2006 (Kelber , 2007 (Kelber , 2009 ). According to Kelber, 'Bultmann's model is burdened with significant problems stemming from a lack of understanding of orality, gospel narrativity, and, last but not least, memory' Mark avails himself of a rich cultural memory for the purpose of securing the Christian identity for a postwar generation. (Kelber 1997:xxiii) I have highlighted the work of Kelber, who extends his studies of orality and scribality with the help of cultural memory and performance theory. I would be remiss not to mention, in this connection, a social memory theorist who, having become acquainted with New Testament studies under the influence of Kirk and Thatcher (2005) , has expressed negative reactions to strong constructionism, whether of Bultmann or Halbwachs. Barry Schwartz argues that Halbwachs' orientation to collective memory is of no help to gospel critics. He notes that, like Bultmann, Halbwachs reduces the infancy and miracle stories to 'extreme instances of construction ' and 'distortion' (2005a:49, 50, cf. 2005b ), a position which he considers to be cynical:
Biblical scholarship, like social memory scholarship and the sociology of knowledge, frequently despairs over its ability to know events as they actually were and finds its triumphant moments in clever reinterpretations or the debunking of what was once believed to be true. (Schwartz 2005a:46) Schwartz also states: 'no assumption, in my view, has done more to undermine the foundation of social memory scholarship or hinder its application to biblical studies ' (2005a:45) . Schwartz wants social memory studies to be positively productive. His own approach is to focus on symbolic forms, such as words, images, institutions and behaviours, in the manner of cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz's finely tuned 'thick description', which stresses the ethnologist's attempt to cipher the subtleties in cultural contexts. Geertz asks, for example, when is an eye twitch an uncontrolled physical twitch? A wink? A faked wink? A burlesque faked wink? A rehearsed burlesque fake wink? (Geertz 1973:3−30 
Observations and Reflections
A brief summary is in order. A number of collective memory theorists see correlations between individual memory and collective memory. That is an important observation not only because in groups it is individuals who remember, but because both individual and collective memory are to some extent constructionist, a major theme of this article.
On the individual side, modern research in neurology and psychology suggests that individuals do not recall actual persons and events, but only previous memories of them, forming a 'cascade of memories'. Such memories can be transformed over time -indeed, 'false memories' are common. This transformation is constructionism. Similarly, from Halbwach's perspective, collective memory is constructed. It is formed and perpetuated in groups; it is selective, usually related to images and places, does not recall the real past (the goal of historical reconstruction), but rather constructs the past for the present, thus 'distorting' the past. Such collective memory emerges from and perpetuates, social identity, usually in the form of a narrative with a positive ending and is reinforced by commemoration. Halbwachs' perspective has influenced many academic fields, but he has also been criticised for his destructive constructionist stance, which is claimed to be a sort of cynical debunking of memory's positive activity. Yet, collective memory can be seen in positive vein as a broad range of mnemonic products and practices, consisting of 'a fluid negotiation between the desires of the present and the legacies of the past'.
Turning to the gospels, Bultmann's influential Form Criticism tends to see oral tradition as an evolution from smaller to larger forms, which leads some to attempt to remove later, secondary accretions in order to arrive at an approximate original form and others to search for Jesus' actual words. Assmann's (1988) view of cultural memory.
The current study highlights the importance of constructionism. Bultmann's evolutionary constructionism in gospel studies may presently be dissipating, as Kelber contends, but constructionism in a more moderate form is still present in the field of memory and performance theory. I wish to consider the theory in terms of two other contexts, the social sciences and philosophy.
The first context is related to the social scientific criticism of the Bible. In the social sciences, outside observers often develop 'etic' or observers' models that are based on both distant and close comparisons, which are informed by abstract social theories that focus on social cooperation, social conflict and social interaction. Perhaps the best-known example of general theory is that of Peter Berger's and Thomas Luckmann's 'social construction of reality ' (1966) which, in its simplest terms, says that the realities which people tend to take for granted as 'objective' are, in fact, socially constructed and maintained.
Take ethnicity as an example. The most influential ethnicity theory since the mid−20th century is found in Frederik Barth's Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (1969) , which I have often used to interpret ethnicity in the ancient Mediterranean world and in the New Testament (Duling , 2005 (Duling , 2006a (Duling , 2008a (Duling , 2008b (Duling , 2010 . For Barth, the 'cultural stuff' of ethnic identity -consisting of such external features as name, archetypal ancestors, ancestry, homeland, language, myths, legends, dress and food -is important, for without such 'stuff' there would be total assimilation and no observable ethnic identity. However, such markers are neither natural, fixed and unchangeable, as people often think they are, nor do they 'produce' ethnic identity. Ethnicity is, therefore, not 'primordial', as it is commonly perceived to be by ethnic members and some theorists, but self-imposed -socially constructed -by groups themselves in order to describe themselves, as well as to differentiate and separate themselves from other groups in their immediate environment. Indeed, members of an ethnic group can change over time. The key is 'the social organization of cultural difference(s),' the subtitle of his book. In relation to the present study, it needs to be observed that the construction of ethnicity and of social memory go hand in hand, which Le Goff calls 'ethnic memory' (1992:55−58).
There is a second, larger context. Barth eventually claimed that his ethnic constructionism had anticipated postmodernism (1994). Barth's later opinion of his own work is not surprising. As Ian Hacking's philosophical analysis of the 'culture wars' and 'science wars' in his The Construction of What? (1999) indicates, many definitions and examples of constructionism exist. Such definitions and examples can be placed on a spectrum from 1-5, that is, from 'weakly' constructionist at one pole (1) to 'strongly' constructionist at the other (5). Although I myself would hesitate to place anyone within Hacking's spectrum, surely Schwartz would see the constructionism of Bultmann and Halbwachs on the strong side and he himself as being positioned somewhere towards the middle. Jeffrey Olick's mediating position also seems to be closer to the middle. The attempt by some performance theorists to find a balance between 'fixity and flexibility', 'continuity and discontinuity', or 'stability and diversity' in performance theory also seems to be an attempt to locate a middle ground.
In this light, I have attempted to give constructionism a fair hearing. Indeed, I have been much influenced by Bultmann in the past and, in my book titled Jesus Christ Through History, viewed the quests as a series of culturally constructed images (Duling 1979 (Carter 1994 (Carter , 1996 (Carter , 1997 , who attempts to correlate 'authorial audience' with 'real audience' (Duling 1999) . Similarly, I have leaned towards constructionism in memory theory in the current article, but have restrained myself in this respect, insofar as I have occasionally referred to a memory core that gives memory some stability within fluidity. I have hinted at such a memory core in interpreting Petrov's perspective on performance, in relation to Crossan's quest for stability, in relation to Olick's middle ground and in my attempts to balance diversity with stability. Perhaps, in terms of Hacking's spectrum, then, I would be a '4' and positioned at the constructionism end of the spectrum, although not at '5', which is its strongest form.
Finally, a personal note again. A Festschrift such as this is a memory site. It is a memorial that honours by perpetuating and preserving. It also has a social context. I commemorate -with other commemorators -the contributions that have been made by Andries Van Aarde as a person, a friend and a scholar. Our memories are, no doubt, constructions, but they are also something more.
